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Introduction
When a firm goes bankrupt, how should its liquidation value be divided among its creditors?
How should an extra time be divided among the activities involved in a project without delaying it? Both problems have been studied in the literature.
The first one is answered in the field of bankruptcy problems. A bankruptcy problem is a pure distribution problem in which the amount to divide is insufficient to cover the agents´claims. They have been introduced and studied by O´Neill (1982) and Aumann and Maschler (1985) among others. The reader is referred to Thomson (2003) and Moulin (2002) for a complete survey.
The second question arises from PERT problems, introduced by Bergantiños and Sánchez (2002B) . These problems are inspired by the Project Evaluation Review Technique, an operational research tool described in detail in Moder and Philips (1970) . This tool is designed to schedule and coordinate the activities involved in a project. Some of these activities must be performed sequentially and others can be performed in parallel with other activities and this collection of serial and parallel tasks can be modeled as a network. Once the schedule is designed and the PERT time (the time required to finish the project) is computed, the coordinator identifies the activities that can be allowed more time if required without delaying the project and estimates the slack associated with each of them. At this point the PERT problem focuses on how to allocate the extra time among these activities without delaying the project in a "well-behaved" manner. Bergantiños and Sánchez (2002A) introduce a general class of problems that contains as subsets bankruptcy and PERT problems and call them problems with constraints and claims (PCC). They study how the proportionality principle works on this new class of problems by proposing two different rules based on it: the proportional rule (weak Pareto optimal) and the extended proportional rule (Pareto optimal). They also characterize the extended rule.
Later, Bergantiños and Lorenzo (2004) center their work on defining allocation rules to solve any problem with constraints and claims following the equal award principle.
In this paper we focus our study on equality but according to losses, regarding that no 2 agent receives a negative amount. We define two single-valued rules: the constrained equal loss rule, a weakly Pareto optimal rule, and the extended constrained equal loss rule, a Pareto optimal rule. The object of this paper is to characterize the extended rule.
There are several characterizations of the constrained equal loss rule in the bankruptcy literature: Herrero (2003) proved that the constrained equal loss rule is the only efficient rule satisfying symmetry, consistency, minimal rights first and composition down. Herrero and Villar (2001) characterized it by means of consistency, exclusion and composition down.
Later, Herrero and Villar (2002) characterized the constrained equal loss rule in terms of independence of residual claims and composition down. Our aim was to extend these characterizations to problems with constraints and claims. For it, we adapt the definitions of the properties to the new model. Bergantiños and Sánchez (2002A) show that the relations among properties in PCC are completely different from the relations of their counterparts in bankruptcy problems. For instance, even though, in bankruptcy problems, Pareto optimality is compatible with composition down, in the new model Pareto optimality becomes incompatible with this property. Thus we define a weaker property called limited composition down which is compatible with Pareto optimality.
We find out that the two characterizations by Herrero and Villar can not be extended since the extended constrained equal loss rule fails to satisfy both exclusion and independence of residual claims. Finally, we extend the characterization by Herrero (2003) by means of Pareto optimality, symmetry, consistency, minimal rights first, limited composition down and we need to add a new property specially defined for PCC, lower bound requirement over subsets. Thus no characterization of the constrained equal loss rule can be extended to our model just by using the same properties as in bankruptcy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces and motivates problems with constraints and claims. Section 3 defines different appealing properties of the allocation rules and finally section 4 is devoted to the rules following the equal loss principle centering the study on the extended constrained equal loss rule and its characterization. 
Problems with constraints and claims
Firstly we introduce some notation.
Given a finite set N we denote by n the cardinality of N . Given x = (x i ) i∈N , y = (y i ) i∈N ∈ R N , x ≥ y means x i ≥ y i for all i ∈ N ; x > y means x i > y i for all i ∈ N and
Given Y ∈ R N we define the Pareto Boundary of Y as
and the Weak Pareto Boundary as
In this kind of problems the issue does not differ too much from bankruptcy (taxation)
problems. We have several agents claiming on an homogeneous and infinitely indivisible resource. But now we assume that there are several subsets of agents, not necessarily disjoint,
given by P and each subset can not be awarded more than a part of the resource available, as it is showed in the next definitions.
Definition 1 A problem with constraints and claims (briefly PCC) is a 4-tuple (N, P, c, E) where N = π∈P π is the set of agents, P is a collection of subsets that covers N , 0 ≤ c ∈ R N is the vector that holds the claims of the agents and E = (E π ) π∈P ∈ R p , where E π represents an upper bound of a part of the resource available for the subset π. We will often write (c, E) instead of (N, P, c, E). We denote by G(N ) the class of PCC with set of agents N , and by G the class of all PCC.
Definition 2 Given (c, E) ∈ G(N ) we define the set of feasible allocations of (c, E) by:
and a rule is a map R that associates with each problem (c, E) ∈ G(N ) an allocation R(c, E) ∈ R N and where each R i (c, E) represents the award received by agent i.
O´Neill (1982) defines a bankruptcy problem as a 3-tuple (N, c, E) where N is the set of claimants, c denotes the vector of claims and E is the resource available.
Bergantiños and Sánchez (2002B) define a PERT problem as a 3-tuple
where G is the directed graph that models the project, N holds the set of activities involved in it, P denotes the set of paths from the beginning till the end of the project and ps π (as i )
is the slack associated with path π (activity i).
Both problems can be seen as particular cases of a problem with constraints and claims as the following table shows:
Bankruptcy problems PERT problems
Properties of the allocation rules
We devote this section to define some desirable properties of the rules. Most of them are well-known properties of the bankruptcy literature but adapted to this general framework.
Although there is one property specifically defined for PCC. Consider an allocation rule R.
Two properties about optimality are defined. Pareto Optimality (PO): for all (c, E) ∈ G(N ) we have that R(c, E) ∈ P B(F (c, E)) and Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO): for all
It is logical to require that agents with equal claims, under the same constraints, receive equal awards. This property is called
A PCC (c, E) can be interpreted as solving many subproblems as subsets in P . And it would be desirable for an agent not to receive less than the minimum amount he is awarded in every subproblem in which he is involved. This is stated by the next property. Lower
Bound Requirement over Subsets (LS): for all (c, E) ∈ G(N ) and every i ∈ N , it is verified that:
This property is trivially satisfied in bankruptcy problems (it states that R(c, E) ≥ R(c, E)), although in PCC there are rules which do not satisfy LS.
We define the minimal right of an agent i as the minimum of the difference between the amount available, in every state in which agent i participates, and the sum of the claims of the other claimants joining that state when this difference is non-negative, and 0 otherwise.
It is interesting to require that the awards vector should be equivalently obtainable directly or by first assigning to each agent his minimal right, adjusting claims and states down by m(c, E), and finally applying the rule to divide the remainder. We say that
Composition Down (CD), also known as Path Independence, states that if the estate value is re-evaluated and found to be worth less than initially thought, if we cancel the initial division and apply the rule to the revised problem or if we consider the initial awards as claims on the revised value and apply the rule to the problem so defined, the awards vectors obtained in both ways of proceeding should coincide. Given (c, E) ∈ G(N ) and
We will denote by Limited Composition Down (LCD) the property composition down restricted to problems with P = {N }.
Consistency says that if some agents leave with their awards, and the PCC is reevaluated from the point of view of the remaining agents, the rule should allocate to these agents the same awards as those obtained in the initial problem. Consistency (CONS): for all
Remark 1 Bergantiños and Sánchez (2002A) show that the relation between these properties changes completely when defined in this general framework. In particular they prove that
Pareto optimality is incompatible with composition up. Following a similar argument it can be proved that Pareto optimality is also incompatible with composition down. Thus PCC are not an straight forward extension of bankruptcy problems.
Rules according to the equal loss principle
In this section we introduce two single-valued rules based on the constrained equal loss principle. This principle states that all agents suffer the same loss, subject to the condition that no creditor ends up with a negative award. The definition of the constrained equal loss rule is very similar to its definition in bankruptcy problems and in order to obtain the extended constrained equal loss rule we apply the equal loss principle repeatedly until no agent can improve his award.
The constrained equal loss rule (briefly CEL) divides equally the losses, provided no agent receives a negative transfer:
It is easy to prove that when c ∈ F (c, E), λ = 0. Otherwise λ can be computed in the following way: λ = max {λ π : π ∈ P } where λ π is such that
This rule was defined in Sánchez (1999) . She proved that CEL satisfies WPO and there always exists a part of the resource available which is completely allocated between its claimants, i.e., there exists π 0 ∈ P such that i∈π0 CEL i (c, E) = E π0 . CEL also satisfies SYM and CD. Nevertheless it fails MRF, CONS and PO. So we will extend this rule such that it satisfies PO, just by applying it repeatedly, according to the following process, until no agent can improve his award.
•
Assume that we have already calculated (N s , P s , c s , E s ) and CEL(c s , E s ) for any s ≤ t.
• step t+1. Let (N t+1 , P t+1 , c t+1 , E t+1 ) be defined by:
This process ends when there exists an stage T where
CEL satisfies WPO, it is always verified that N t+1 N t and hence the process described above will end in a finite number of steps T . For every i ∈ N there also exists an stage T i such that i ∈ N Ti but i / ∈ N Ti+1 . Then for each i ∈ N we define the extended constrained equal loss rule ECEL as
Remark 2 Notice that if during the process above there is an stage t where λ t = 0 then the process ends at stage t, c t ∈ F (c t , E t ) and every agent involved in that stage is awarded all his claim.
Proposition 1 Given (c, E) ∈ G(N ) it is verified that:
1. λ t+1 < λ t for every t = 1, . . . , T − 1.
ECEL
Proof. Given (c, E) ∈ G(N ).
1. Let us suppose that λ t ≤ λ t+1 .
Given the problem (c t+1 , E t+1 ) we know by the definition of CEL that λ t+1 is the minimum feasible loss. We will show that λ t is also feasible. Since c
Thus λ t ≥ λ t+1 . Therefore λ t = λ t+1 and
Since E t+1 π t+1 > 0 for all π t+1 ∈ P t+1 we can find a feasible loss λ < λ t+1 and we have a contradiction with the fact that λ t+1 is the minimum feasible loss in the problem (c t+1 , E t+1 ). Hence λ t > λ t+1 for every t = 1, . . . , T − 1.
2. Consider i ∈ N such that i ∈ N Ti but i / ∈ N Ti+1 . Thus
We know that c Given this new definition of c t i , we can rewrite the extended equal loss rule as
Ti 3. We will prove that for any t = 1, . . . , T − 1 there always exists a subset π ∈ P such
We study what happens for t = 1 as the other cases are similar.
By the definition of CEL there always exists π 0 ∈ P such that
4. Given i ∈ N with ECEL i (c, E) < c i , suppose that for every π ∈ P such that i ∈ π,
Due to the definition of ε we have that
and this is a contradiction.
Proposition 2 The extended constrained equal loss rule satisfies WPO, PO, LCD, SYM, LS, CONS and MRF.
Proof. Of course it satisfies WPO and PO because of the definition. It also satisfies LCD because when P = {N }, ECEL(c, E) = CEL(c, E) and the constrained equal loss rule satisfies composition down (Sánchez (1999) ).
• ECEL satisfies SYM. Given agents i, j ∈ N such that c i = c j and i ∈ π ⇔ j ∈ π, we have to prove that ECEL i (c, E) = ECEL j (c, E).
Since CEL satisfies symmetry, it is verified that CEL i (c
Consider (N 2 , P 2 , c 2 , E 2 ). We have that c
Thus we are again under symmetry conditions and therefore
There is only rest to prove that
which is a contradiction. Assuming T j < T i ≤ T we will reach another contradiction. Thus T i = T j and hence ECEL i (c, E) = ECELj(c, E).
• ECEL satisfies LS. Given an agent i ∈ N we will prove that
Given an agent i ∈ N with T i = 1, we know that
If λ 1 = 0, by remark 2, c ∈ F (c, E), ECEL i (c, E) = c i and LS holds trivially. So we will assume that λ 1 > 0. Then ECEL i (c, E) < c i . By proposition 1.4 there
Given an agent i ∈ N with T i = 2. By proposition 1.2 ECEL i (c, E) = c i − min{c i , λ 2 }.
Again if λ 2 = 0, ECEL i (c, E) = c i and LS holds trivially. Thus we will assume λ 2 > 0 11 and hence ECEL i (c, E) < c i . By proposition 1.4 there exists π ∈ P with i ∈ π such
Taking into account the equation above and the following
.
Using similar arguments to those used before we can conclude that for any agent i ∈ N
Hence ECEL satisfies LS.
• ECEL satisfies CONS : Given (c, E) and M ⊂ N we have to prove that
When c ∈ F (c, E) the property holds trivially, thus we will restrict the proof to the case when c / ∈ F (c, E). We introduce some sets and notation that will be used during the proof:
Notice that for every agent in M 0 it is verified that ECEL i (c, E) = 0.
-
We will prove that λ
M , c i = 0 it is verified that c i = 0 for all i ∈ M * and λ
By remark 2 we know that c T ∈ F (c T , E T ) and ECEL i (c, E) = c i for all i ∈ N t .
It is trivial to prove that c M ∈ F (c M , E M ) and therefore
Thus in order to avoid trivial situations we will assume that max
First we will prove that max
As long as λ 1 M is the minimum feasible loss, λ
Reached this point we need to consider two different cases:
By proposition 1.4 there exists π ∈ P with i ∈ π such that π ∩ N
Applying the same argument consecutively, we can conclude that ECEL satisfies CONS.
• It satisfies MRF. Given (c, E) ∈ G(N ) we have to prove that
where m i (c, E) = max 0, min
First we will prove that ECEL i (c, E) ≥ m i (c, E) for all i ∈ N . It is trivial when
that c π ∈ F (c π , E π ) for all π ∈ P : i ∈ π and since ECEL satisfies PO we have that
. Thus we will prove that ECEL i (c, E) ≥ m i (c, E) when ECEL i (c, E) < c i and 0 < m i (c, E) < c i . Notice that the last inequality implies that
Since ECEL i (c, E) < c i , by proposition 1.4, there exists π ∈ P such that i ∈ π,
-If min{c i , λ Ti } = c i ≤ c i then m i (c, E) = 0 and the equality holds.
Consider an agent i ∈ N such that
If λ 1 = 0, by remark 2, c ∈ F (c, E), ECEL(c, E) = c = m(c, E) and MRF holds trivially. So we will assume λ 1 > 0.
Given the problem (c , E ), consider CEL j (c , E ) = c j − min c j , λ 1 . We will prove that λ 1 = λ 1 . Firstly we will show that λ 1 is a feasible loss:
Since
Hence λ 1 ≤ λ 1 and therefore λ 1 = λ 1 .
Thus all the agents in N 1 \ N 2 also leave the process in the first stage, in the problem (c , E ), and are awarded c j − min c j , λ 1 = c j − m j (c, E) − min c j , λ 1 . In particular for agent i we obtain:
Consider an agent i ∈ N such that T i = 2. Given M = N 2 , we define the problem (M, P M , c M , E M ) in the usual way. Since ECEL satisfies CONS, in order to prove that ECEL satisfies MRF we will prove that
where
We have just proved that
Consider CEL(c M , E M ) = c i − min {c i , λ 2 }. Let us prove that λ 2 = λ 2 . Firstly we will prove that λ 2 is a feasible loss.
In order to avoid trivial situations we assume λ 2 > 0. Therefore ECEL i (c, E) = c i −min{c i , λ 2 } < c i . By proposition 1.4 there exists π ∈ P such that i ∈ π, π∩N 2 = ∅,
And therefore
Hence λ 2 ≤ λ 2 and λ 2 = λ 2 .
Following the same argument for every stage t = 3, . . . , T we can conclude that ECEL satisfies MRF.
Theorem 1
The extended constrained equal loss rule is the only rule satisfying PO, LS, SYM, MRF, CONS and LCD.
Proof. By proposition 2 we know that ECEL satisfies PO, LS, SYM, MRF, CONS and LCD. Thus to prove the uniqueness let us suppose that there exists an allocation rule R satisfying PO, LS, SYM, MRF, CONS and LCD.
When c ∈ F (c, E), by PO R(c, E) = c = ECEL(c, E). So we will assume c / ∈ F (c, E).
We will prove the uniqueness by induction in the number of estates p = |P |.
• When p = 1, P = {N }: In this case ECEL i (c, E) = CEL i (c, E).
We know, from Herrero (2003) , that the constrained equal loss rule is the only efficient rule satisfying MRF, CD and SYM. As R satisfies PO, MRF, LCD and SYM we have that R(c, E) = CEL(c, E) = ECEL(c, E).
• Let us assume that R(c, E) = ECEL(c, E) when p ≤ k − 1.
We have just proved that when there is only one estate, R coincides with ECEL which also coincides with CEL.
By definition of CEL we know that there always exists π 0 ∈ P such that i∈π0
As R i (c, E) ≥ CEL i (c, E) for all i ∈ N and both rules satisfy PO, we can conclude
Consider M = N \{π 0 } and the following problem (M,
by the induction supposition and taking into account that both rules satisfy CONS we have that
Since R i (c, E) = ECEL i (c, E) for every i ∈ π 0 we have that R(c, E) = ECEL(c, E).
Remark 3 Not every characterization of the constrained equal loss in bankruptcy problems can be extended to problems with constraints and claims by the aid of consistency and lower bound requirement over subsets. Herrero and Villar (2001) characterize the constrained equal loss rule with CONS, CD and Exclusion ( EXC). This property states that if an agent's claim is smaller than the loss per capita, he should be awarded nothing. We can adapt this property to this new framework in the following way: we say that a rule R satisfies EXC if given an agent whose claim verifies that c i ≤ L π |π| for all π ∈ P with i ∈ π, where
But ECEL does not satisfy EXC: Consider N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, P = {π 1 , π 2 , π 3 } with , 5, 5, 4, 9 ) and E = (11, 11, 5). The vector of losses per capita is L = (4, 4, 8) and for every π ∈ P with 1 ∈ π it is verified that
Notice that not only he receives a positive award but he is awarded all his claim.
Furthermore, Herrero and Villar (2002) again characterize the constrained equal loss rule in terms of CD and Independence of residual claims (IRC). This property states that if an agent's claim is residual, i.e, the aggregate claim that results from deducting c i from all agents whose claims are higher than c i exceeds the worth of the available estate, this agent should be awarded nothing. In PCC this property says that if E π ≤ j∈π max{0, c j − c i } for all π ∈ P such that i ∈ π then R i (c, E) = 0. But again ECEL fails to satisfy IRC. If we consider the example above, the claim of agent 1 is residual, although ECEL 1 (c, E) = 1.
This shows that in the new model the extended constrained equal loss rule is less detrimental with agents with small claims than it is in bankruptcy problems.
To end this section we proof that the properties that characterize the extended constrained equal loss rule are independent but LCD. We do not know what happens with LCD.
• Given (c, E) ∈ G(N ). We define the following rule R(c, E) = c. It clearly satisfies all properties but PO.
• Given (c, E) ∈ G(N ) consider the extended proportional rule EP RO (Bergantiños and Sánchez (2002A) ). Of course it satisfies PO, LS, CONS, SYM and LCD although it does not satisfy MRF. Consider the problem (N, P, c, E) with N = {1, 2, 3}, P = {N }, c = (6, 6, 3) and E = 12. We have that m(c, E) + EP RO(c , E ) = (3, 3, 0) + (2, 2, 2) = (5, 5, 2), although EP RO(c, E) = (4.8, 4.8, 2.4).
• Given (c, E) ∈ G(N ) let us define a priority rule R(c, E) where agents get their award according to the order 1, 2, . . . , n. (2000)), LS, MRF and CONS. Nevertheless, R does not satisfy SYM, just consider the following example: N = {1, 2}, P = {N }, c = (2, 2) and E = 3. Then R(c, E) = (2, 1).
• Given (c, E) ∈ G(N ) consider the following relation between agents: i ∼ j ⇔ for every π ∈ P , i ∈ π ⇔ j ∈ π. We denote by [k] the equivalence class of agent k ∈ N . We can associate with every equivalence class [k] a vector x k = (x k π ) π∈P ∈ R p such that:
We define the rule in two stages: 1 The problem played by the equivalence classes is defined in detail in Bergantiños and Sánchez (2002A) 22 R satisfies PO, SYM, LCD, MRF and CONS. Nevertheless LS is not satisfied. Consider the following example: N = {1, 2, 3}, P = {π 1 , π 2 } with π 1 = {1, 2}, π 2 = {2, 3}, c = (4, 6, 4) and E = (4, 4). The lexicographic order is [2], [1] and [3] . We obtain R(c, E) = (0, 4, 0) although min 1∈π∈P R 1 (c π , E π ) = CEL 1 (c π1 , E π1 ) = 1.
• Given (c, E) ∈ G(N ). Let us consider the following rule: 5 References
